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Abstract 
This paper examines whether the baseline Mortensen-Pissarides matching model can 
account for the housing market facts, namely: the existence of price dispersion, the 
positive correlation between housing price and time-on-the-market, and between 
housing price and trading volume. Our main finding is that the model can account for 
these three basic facts of the housing market, thus showing that the basic matching 
framework can be seen as the benchmark macroeconomic model not only for the 
labour market but for any market with frictions. 
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matching process. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Housing markets are characterised by a decentralised exchange framework with 
important search and matching frictions. It has, in fact, been acknowledged that 
housing markets clear not only through price but also through the time and money 
that a buyer and a seller spend on the market. Consequently, the search and matching 
approach is widely used even in the real estate market (for an overview, see section 2). 
Furthermore, three basic facts have been repeatedly reported: (a) the positive 
correlation between housing price and time-on-the-market (see Leung, Leong and 
Chan, 2002; Anglin et al. 2003; Merlo and Ortalo-Magne, 2004, among others);
1
 (b) the 
positive correlation between housing price and trading volume (see Leung, Lau and 
Leong, 2002; Fisher et al., 2003, among others); (c) the existence of price dispersion. 
Price dispersion (or price volatility) is probably the most important distinctive 
feature of housing markets. It refers to the phenomenon of selling two houses with 
very similar attributes and in near locations at the same time but at very different 
prices. Although price dispersion research is more commonly found in studies of non-
durable consumption goods,
2
 price dispersion studies on durable and re-saleable 
goods such as real estate are also growing rapidly (for an overview see Leung, Leong 
and Wong, 2006). Real estate is in fact the most important durable consumption good 
and one of the most important assets for most household portfolios (Leung, Leong and 
Wong, 2006). Since most real estate transactions come from re-sales between buyers 
and sellers (transactions in the housing markets are in fact dominated by a second-
hand market), it should not be surprising that price dispersion exists even in the 
housing market (Leung, Leong and Wong, 2006). 
In a nutshell, the variance in house prices cannot be attributed completely to 
the heterogeneous nature of real estate. Remaining price differentials are in fact 
empirically non negligible. A significant part of housing price dispersion is basically due 
to the heterogeneity of buyers and sellers, in particular their sustained search costs 
(see e.g. Leung and Zhang, 2011). Vukina and Zheng (2010) find very strong empirical 
                                                 
1
 The time it takes to sell a property, the so-called time-on-the-market (TOM), measures the degree of 
illiquidity of the real estate asset and is a fundamental characteristic differentiating real estate from 
financial assets. 
2
 A literature review on price dispersion can be found in Baye et al. (2006). 
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support for the theoretical prediction that bargaining with search costs explains price 
dispersion in the agricultural market. 
Nevertheless, the search and matching process is by itself able to explain the 
price dispersion. The main aim of this paper is to develop a search and matching model 
à la Mortensen-Pissarides (see e.g. the textbook by Pissarides, 2000) that explains the 
basic facts of housing markets only relying on the specific nature of the search and 
matching process in the real estate market. Precisely, we develop a decentralised long-
run equilibrium model in which agents differ only with respect to their state in the 
house-search process and can change their condition after a match. The proposed 
work takes the distinctive feature of the considered market into account, where the 
formal distinction between buyer and seller becomes very subtle. In the model, in fact, 
a seller can become a buyer and vice versa. Indeed, most houses are bought by those 
who already own one, and most houses are sold by those wanting to buy another 
house (Janssen et al., 1994); buyers today are in fact potential sellers tomorrow 
(Leung, Leong and Wong, 2006). 
In this model, price dispersion comes from the different kinds of matching 
which occur in the housing market. Also, this theoretical model is able to explain two 
other well-known empirical regularities, namely the positive correlation between 
housing price and time-on-the-market, and between housing price and trading volume. 
Therefore, this paper clearly shows that the behaviour of the housing market, reflected 
in the above empirical findings, can be addressed adequately by the standard matching 
framework à la Mortensen-Pissarides.
3
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 briefly reviews the 
literature which makes use of the search and matching models to study the housing 
market; section 3 presents our housing market matching model; while section 4 
concludes. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This paper belongs to the recent and growing literature that uses search and matching 
models to explain the behaviour of housing markets. The first search model of the 
                                                 
3
 Although this approach is commonly used in the labour market, Wasmer and Weil (2004) show that it 
can also be used to describe matching difficulties between financial backers (banks) and firms. 
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housing market is Wheaton’s (1990). Since then, several papers have developed 
models to analyse the formation process of prices in housing markets with 
search/matching/trading frictions (see Table 1 for a summary). 
========== Table 1 about here now at the end ========== 
Furthermore, recent search and matching models of the housing market (Diaz 
and Jerez, 2009; Novy-Marx, 2009; Piazzesi and Schneider, 2009; Genesove and Han, 
2010; Leung and Zhang, 2011; Peterson, 2012) adopt an aggregate matching function 
and some of them also focus on the role of market tightness in determining the 
probability of matching between the parties. This is in line with the standard matching 
approach (see Pissarides, 2000). The main difference between our model and those in 
the quoted studies is that we closely track the standard matching framework à la 
Mortensen-Pissarides without any significant deviation from the baseline model.
4
 
Among this literature, our model is most related to the competitive search 
framework developed by Leung and Zhang (2011), since it aims to explain the three 
basic facts of the housing market. In Leung and Zhang (2011), a necessary condition for 
explaining the housing market facts is the heterogeneity on the seller's and/or the 
buyer's side, which generates corresponding submarkets. Precisely, Leung and Zhang 
(2011) focus on one-side heterogeneity and assume that sellers are different in terms 
of their waiting costs for selling the house, where buyers are free to enter either 
submarket. However, in their model the reservation value of a buyer is exogenous and 
sellers commit to “stay” in one of the submarkets.
5
 Furthermore, in our model the 
free-entry or zero-profit condition for sellers à la Pissarides, rather than the buyer's 
free entry assumption used by Leung and Zhang (2011), allows to obtain a solution 
which characterises the direct relationship between market tightness and house price.
6
 
                                                 
4
 For example, Diaz and Jerez (2009), Novy-Marx (2009), Genesove and Han (2010), Leung and Zhang 
(2011), and Peterson (2012) define the market tightness from a buyer perspective, i.e. housing market 
tightness is the ratio of buyers to sellers. Instead, we prefer to use the standard definition of tightness, 
thus considering the ratio of vacant houses to home seekers (the buyers). In the labour market, in fact, 
tightness is the ratio of job vacancies to job seekers. In Piazzesi and Schneider (2009), houses for sale 
and potential buyers enter the matching function. 
5
 Sellers with higher waiting costs (the so-called impatient or "fire-sale" sellers) are willing to accept 
lower prices, which attract a larger number of potential buyers so that the house can be sold faster. 
However, patient sellers (sellers with lower waiting costs) may find it profitable to enter that sub-
market. 
6
 In Leung and Zhang (2011), the equilibrium is in fact determined by a system of three equations in 
three unknowns, where the value of seller, the value of buyer and the house price depend on market 
tightness. As a result, with a fixed entry value for the buyers and a fixed number of sellers, they first 
solve the market tightness, and then the seller value and the house price. Indeed, also in Genesove and 
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The free-entry condition for sellers is also used by Albrecht et al. (2009) to endogenise 
housing market tightness. Nevertheless, in their model, search is directed rather than 
random, houses are sold by auction rather than by bargaining and sellers post prices to 
attract buyers.   
 
3. A BASELINE MATCHING MODEL OF HOUSING MARKET 
3.1 The hypotheses of the model 
We adopt a standard matching framework à la Mortensen-Pissarides (see e.g. 
Pissarides, 2000) with random search and prices determined by Nash bargaining. The 
random matching assumption is absolutely compatible with a market where the formal 
distinction between the demand and supply side is very subtle; whereas, bargaining is 
a natural outcome of decentralised markets for heterogeneous goods. 
Since we are interested in selling price, the market of reference is the 
homeownership market rather than the rental market. In this way, if a contract is 
legally binding (as hypothesised) it is no longer possible to return to the circumstances 
preceding the bill of sale, unless a new and distinct contractual relationship is set up. In 
matching model jargon this means that the destruction rate of a specific buyer-seller 
match does not exist. As a result, the value of an occupied home for a seller is simply 
given by the selling price, while the buyer gets the house. 
The economy is populated by sellers and buyers. Sellers ( s ) hold h  houses 
(with 2h ≥ ) of which 1h −  are on the market;7 hence, vacancies ( v ) are simply given 
by ( ) s1hv ⋅−= . Buyers ( b ) expend costly search effort to find a house (if they are 
homeless persons) or a new house (if they already hold a house). It is therefore 
possible that a buyer can become a seller and that a seller can re-enter the market as a 
buyer. In particular, the following transitions are possible:
8
 
                                                                                                                                               
Han (2010) there are fewer equations than unknowns, and in order to close the model they assume a 
constant value for the buyer’s search and an infinite supply of buyers, thus assuming that buyers can 
choose among a large number of markets, while sellers are tied to a specific market. 
7
 Since there is no rental market, this is a reasonable assumption. 
8
 In the housing market is more interesting to study the transition from seller (buyer) to buyer (seller), 
rather than the dynamic in and out of the homelessness. According to Wheaton (p. 1274, 1990), in fact, 
although homelessness is equivalent to unemployment, shifts in the housing market are voluntary 
changes in the labour market and involve periods in which the household owns two (or more) units, 
whereas voluntary job transitions usually imply spells of unemployment. 
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TABLE 2. Transitions in the housing market 
From To 
Homeless-buyer Homeowner-buyer 
Homeowner-buyer Seller 
Seller Homeowner-buyer 
also, sellers can remain sellers. In this model, buyers differ only with respect to their 
state in the house-search process. We distinguish the two different buyer states by the 
upscript { }on,i ∈ , where n = homeless-buyer, and o = homeowner-buyer. Also, agents 
can change their condition in the search process (see table 2). Hence, sellers are not 
able to distinguish between the two different buyer states, i.e. the buyers always 
appear identical to sellers ex ante.
9
 However, when the parties meet each other, the 
seller will observe the state of buyer ex post. Nevertheless, s/he always decides to sell 
since the search is costly in terms of time and money. In a nutshell, if the search is 
costly and random, it is not optimal for the seller to reject an offer and wait for a new 
one. Sellers accept offers as long as the selling price is higher than the value of a vacant 
house.
10
 
The expected values of a vacant house (V ) and of finding a house ( H ) are 
given by: 
11, 12
 
( ) [ ]VPθqarV −⋅+−=                             [1] 
( ) ( ) [ ]PHxθgeyδ1rH iii −−⋅+−⋅−=                           [2] 
where 
b
v
bb
v
θ
no
=
+
≡  is the “overall” housing market tightness from the sellers’ 
standpoint; while ( )θq  and ( )θg  are, respectively, the (instantaneous) probability of 
filling a vacant house and of finding a home; also, the standard hypothesis of constant 
returns to scale in the matching function, { }bv,mm = , is adopted (see Pissarides, 
                                                 
9
 Alternatively, one could assume that the homeless are ashamed to reveal their status. 
10
 Indeed, this condition is always satisfied in a non-trivial equilibrium. 
11
 Time is continuous; individuals are risk neutral, live infinitely and discount future payoffs at the 
exogenous interest rate r > 0. As usual in matching-type models, the analysis is restricted to the 
stationary state. 
12
 Note that the expression for the value of a vacant house should be the following: 
( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ]VPβ1θqVPβθqarV no −⋅−⋅+−⋅⋅+−=  
where b/obβ =  and ( ) b/nbβ-1 =  are, respectively, the fraction of homeowner-buyers and 
homeless-buyers. However, since the buyers always appear identical to sellers ex ante, also the selling 
prices appear identical to sellers ex ante, i.e. PPP no == . Hence, the expression collapses to 
equation [1]. 
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2000; Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001),
13
 since it is also used in the recent search 
models of the housing market (see Diaz and Jerez, 2009; Novy-Marx, 2009; Piazzesi 
and Schneider, 2009; Genesove and Han, 2010; Leung and Zhang, 2011; Peterson, 
2012). Hence, the properties of these functions are straightforward: ( ) 0θq' <  and 
( ) 0θg' > .14 The term a  represents the cost flows sustained by sellers for the 
advertisement of vacancies; whereas, e  represents the effort flows in monetary terms 
made by buyers to find and visit the largest possible number of houses. If a contract is 
stipulated, the buyer gets a benefit x  from the property (abandoning the home 
searching value) and pays the sale price P  to the seller (who abandons the value of 
finding another buyer). The buyer’s benefit x  depends on the housing characteristics 
(i.e. the value of the house) and it does not depend on the buyer’s state.
15
 Finally, 
oy  
is the homeowner-buyer’s benefit deriving from the old house. In order to avoid that 
the mass of homeless persons can go to zero, we assume that during the search the 
homeowner-buyer can lose (for economic reasons) the old house at the exogenous 
rate δ , i.e. [ ]on yyδ −⋅ , with, obviously, 0=ny . 
 
3.2 Search equilibrium and the trade-off between house prices and 
time-on-the-market 
In this housing market with search frictions, the endogenous variables that are 
determined simultaneously at equilibrium are market tightness (θ ) and sale price ( P ). 
The customary long-term equilibrium condition, namely the “zero-profit” or 
“free-entry” condition, normally used in the matching models (see Pissarides, 2000) 
yields the first key relationship of the model, in which market tensions are a positive 
function of price. In fact, using the condition 0V =  in [1], we obtain: 
                                                 
13
 This matching technology is consistent with the assumption of undirected or random search. By 
assuming undirected or random search, both homeowner-buyers and homeless-buyers have the same 
probability of meeting sellers. Hence, it is the total number of buyers that enters the matching function. 
14
 Standard technical assumptions are assumed: ( ) ( ) ∞==
∞→→ θglimθqlim θ0θ , and 
( ) ( ) 0θqlimθglim θ0θ == ∞→→ . By definition, markets with frictions require positive and finite tightness, i.e. 
∞<< θ0 , since for 0=θ  the vacancies are always filled, whereas for ∞=θ  the home-seekers 
immediately find a vacant house. 
15
 Also in Albrecht et al. (2007) and Leung and Zhang (2011) the value of the house is independent of 
agent types. 
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( ) ( )
a
P
θqθq
P
a 1
=⇒=
−
                [3] 
with 0
P
θ
>
∂
∂
, since ( ) ( )θq
1
θq
1
≡
−
 is increasing in θ . This positive relationship is very 
intuitive: in fact, if the price increases, more vacant houses will be on the market. 
The free-entry condition also implies a trade-off between the housing price and 
the speed of sale for the seller. In fact, with an arrival rate of ( )θq , the expected time-
on-the-market is ( ) 1−θq . As a result, from [3] there is a positive correlation between 
housing price and the time-on-the-market, since a higher price requires a longer time 
to sell a house (as pointed out by Leung, Leong and Chan, 2002; Anglin et al. 2003; 
Merlo and Ortalo-Magne, 2004; Leung and Zhang, 2011). 
The generalised Nash bargaining solution, usually used for decentralised 
markets, allows the sale price P  to be obtained through the optimal subdivision of 
surplus deriving from a successful match. The surplus is defined as the sum of the 
seller’s and buyer’s value when the trade takes place, net of the respective external 
options, i.e. the value of continuing to search (recall that in equilibrium 0V = ):  
( ) ( ) i
buyer of gain  capital
i
seller of gain  capital
HxHxVPsurplus −=−−+−=
43421321
P  
The price is then obtained by solving the following optimisation condition: 
( ) ( ){ }γ1iγ PHxVP argmaxP −−−⋅−=  
Hence, by the first order condition (FOC) we get:  
( ) ( )PHxγ1
γ
P i −−⋅
−
=⇒   
( )iHxγP −⋅=⇒  
where 1γ0 <<  is the share of bargaining power of sellers. Entering into a contractual 
agreement obviously implies that the surplus is always positive, i.e. 
iHx > , θ∀ . This 
realistic condition on the buyers’ side also ensures that the price is positive. Simple 
manipulations yield the equation for the selling price: 
( )( )
( ) ( )γ1θgr
eyδ-1-rxγ
P
i
−⋅+
+⋅⋅
=
                                                                                                           
[4] 
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being 
( ) ( ) ( )
γr
γ1
Pθg
r
eyδ-1
H
i
i
⋅
−
⋅⋅+
−⋅
= , and ( ) ( )
γ
γ1
PPHx i
−
⋅=−−  from the 
FOC. As market tensions increase, the probability of finding a home increases, and the 
sale price decreases; hence, we obtain the second key relationship of the model: 
0
θ
P
<
∂
∂
. In short, if the market tightness increases, the effect of the well-known 
congestion externalities on the demand side (see Pissarides, 2000) will lower the price. 
By combining equations [3] and [4], this model is able to reproduce the 
observed joint behaviour of prices and time-on-the-market: in fact, the house with a 
higher selling price has a longer time on the market (see equation (3)), but, ceteris 
paribus, the longer the time-on-the-market the lower the sale price (see Krainer, 2001; 
Merlo and Ortalo-Magne, 2004; Leung and Zhang, 2011; Diaz and Jerez, 2009), since 
both ( ) 1−θq  and ( )θg  are increasing in θ . 
PROPOSITION 1: The standard matching model extended to the housing market 
is able to mimic the trade-off between selling price and time-on-the-market. 
Finally, given the properties of the matching probabilities (see footnote 15), it is 
straightforward to obtain from equation [3] that when P  tends to zero (infinity), θ  
tends to zero (infinity), as ( )θq  tends to infinity (zero). Consequently, given the 
negative slope of equation [4], with positive intercept, and the fact that the selling 
price is always positive, the following remark can be stated: 
REMARK: Only one long term equilibrium deriving from the intersection of the 
two curves exists in the model (see point A in Figure 1). 
========== Figure 1 about here (now at the end) ========== 
 
3.3 Comparative statics, price dispersion and trading volume 
From equation [4], the selling price clearly depends on the bargaining power of the 
parties. Also, the selling price crucially depends on the search costs of buyers and 
sellers. In particular, from [4] it is straightforward to obtain that an increase in the 
search effort of buyers increases the selling price, since a higher e  implies a more 
eager buyer. As regards the effect of advertising vacancies on the selling price, an 
increase in a  decreases market tightness θ , which in turn increases the selling price 
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(since ( )θg  is lower). In short, an increase in the seller’s search cost also leads to an 
increase in the selling price (see point A’ in Figure 2). 
========== Figure 2 about here (now at the end) ========== 
Intuitively, the trading volume for a given period, i.e. the number of contracts 
traded during a given period, is given by the matching rate (see Leung and Zhang, 
2011). Following Pissarides (2000), it is straightforward to include the search 
cost/effort of sellers and buyers in the matching function, i.e. { }bev,amm ⋅⋅=  , with 
be
va
θ
⋅
⋅
≡ ; indeed, on the one hand, the search process involves costs; on the other, 
those costs allow the matching probability to increase.
16
 Hence, in the “extended” 
matching function, an increase in the search effort or in advertising vacancies will 
increase the matching rate m . As a result, the model could also explain the positive 
relationship between housing price and trading volume, since an increase in the search 
costs of buyers and sellers increases both the selling price and the matching rate. This 
is in line with the empirical works of Fisher et al. (2003) and Leung, Lau and Leong 
(2002). 
PROPOSITION 2: In the baseline Mortensen-Pissarides model of the housing 
market we find a positive correlation between house prices and trading volume. 
A partially counter-intuitive result regards the effect of the rate δ  on the selling 
price: in facts, the worse the economic condition, the higher the selling price. 
Finally, we consider two similar houses, which give the same benefit x (i.e. 
which have the same housing characteristics). In this case, price dispersion comes from 
the two different buyer states in the house-search process. Hence, housing prices 
would be different even for identical houses. In a nutshell, the house price depends on 
the kind of matching. Specifically, the homeless will pay a higher price for the same 
house, i.e. ( ) ( ) 0>− xPxP on , since their need for buying a house is greater. 
Furthermore, the higher 
oy  (and/or the lower δ ), the larger the price differential. 
                                                 
16
 The search intensity and the cost of advertising vacancies may be seen as parameters of technological 
change in the matching function (see Pissarides, p. 124, 2000). The search intensity decision may be 
endogenised (see e.g. Yashiv, 2007). In the housing market, this implies that a buyer will choose the 
search effort which maximises the value of finding a home. In this case, a convex search cost function is 
usually assumed and the probability of finding a home also depends on the search intensity. It is 
straightforward to find that the optimal search intensity depends on: i) market tightness (positively); ii) 
the house value (positively); and iii) the house price (negatively). 
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PROPOSITION 3: Price dispersion exists in the basic model à la Mortensen-
Pissarides only relying on the specific nature of the search and matching process in the 
housing market. 
 
3.4 Closing the model with the natural vacancy rate and the 
homelessness equation 
In order to find the “natural” vacancy rate, i.e. the optimal share of houses for sale on 
the market that prevails in long term equilibrium at which sellers make no economic 
profits (see Arnott and Igarashi, 2000; McDonald, 2000), we normalise the population 
in the housing market to the unit, i.e. 
no bbs ++=1 . As a result, using the definitions 
of equilibrium tightness, 
no bb
v
θ*θ
+
≡= , and vacancies, ( ) s1hv ⋅−= , it 
straightforward to obtain the stock of sellers and the “natural” vacancy rate: 
*θ1h
*θ
s
+−
=                               [5] 
( )
*θ1h
*θ1h
v
+−
⋅−
=                  [6] 
these equations have very intuitive properties: 0
*θ
s
>
∂
∂
 and 0
*θ
v
>
∂
∂
. 
Instead, the evolution of homelessness in the course of time (
nb& ) is the 
following: 
( ) non bθgbδb ⋅−⋅=&                                       [7] 
where 
obδ ⋅  represents the homelessness inflows, i.e. the homeowner-buyers who 
lose the old house at rate δ ; whereas, ( ) nbθg ⋅  describes the homelessness outflows, 
i.e. the homeless that find a home. Therefore, in steady state (with 0=nb& ) we get: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) δθg
s1δ
bbs1δbθgbθgbδ nnnno
+
−⋅
=⇒−−⋅=⋅⇒⋅=⋅                       [8] 
with, obviously, 0
δ
bn
>
∂
∂
 and ( ) 0g
bn
<
∂
∂
θ
. 
Eventually, by using the “summing-up” condition or the homelessness identity, 
namely 
nono bsbbbs −−=⇒++= 11 , we find the share of homeowner-buyers. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
Housing markets are characterised by a decentralised framework of exchange with 
important search and matching frictions. Furthermore, three basic facts have been 
repeatedly reported by empirical studies: 1) the variance in house prices cannot be 
completely attributed to the heterogeneous nature of real estate and the residual 
price volatility is empirically non negligible; 2) the positive relationship between 
housing price and the number of contracts traded during a given period (trading 
volume); 3) the trade-off between housing price and the speed of sale for the seller. 
This theoretical paper clearly shows that the behaviour of housing markets, reflected 
in the above empirical findings, can be addressed adequately by the standard matching 
framework à la Mortensen-Pissarides. 
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FIGURE 2. Increase in the advertising costs of vacancies 
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TABLE 1. Search and matching models of housing market: a summary 
Author/s 
Key mechanism or insight 
behind the model 
Price determination 
Characteristics of 
search and 
matching process 
Main result 
Wheaton (1990) 
households move when a stochastic 
process leaves them dissatisfied with 
their current unit (moving or changing 
houses involves transaction costs) 
Nash bargaining 
matching function 
+ random search 
the model yields a strong theoretical relationship 
(inverse) between vacancy and prices, which with 
competitive supply explains the existence of longer-
run "structural" vacancy 
Krainer (2001) 
as in Wheaton (1990), trade in housing 
market takes place because individuals 
are vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks 
that break the match with their house 
sellers makes a take-it-
or-leave-it offer 
random search 
liquidity can be good while prices are high (“hot” 
markets) because the opportunity cost of failing to 
complete a trade is high for both buyers and sellers 
Albrecht et al. (2007) 
buyers and sellers move from one state 
(relaxed) into another (desperate), at 
the exogenous constant rate, if they 
remain unmatched 
Nash bargaining 
traders meet each 
other (randomly) at 
the exogenous 
constant rate 
the expected price conditional on time to sale falls 
with time spent on the market, whereas the 
conditional variance of price first rises and then falls 
with time on the market 
Caplin and Leahy 
(2008) 
mismatch between sellers and buyers; 
whenever there is excess demand, 
sellers extract the maximal price; 
whenever there is excess supply, sellers 
must be indifferent between sales today 
and sales tomorrow 
Bertrand competition 
among sellers 
Search is a “black 
box” (however it is 
not directed) 
the model generates the positive correlation 
between price changes and the volume of 
transactions displayed by the data 
Novy-Marx (2009) 
market participants optimally respond 
to shocks in a manner that amplifies a 
shock’s initial impact, which in turn 
further elicits  a reinforcing response 
Nash bargaining 
 
matching function 
+ random search 
+ market tightness 
 
the model generates a positive correlation between 
prices and tightness, but not necessarily a positive 
correlation between prices and the volume of 
transactions 
 
Ngai and Tenreyro 
(2009) 
Amplification mechanism due to the 
“thick-market effect” on “match-specific 
quality”: in a market with more houses 
for sale, a buyer is more likely to find a 
better match; this makes it appealing to 
all agents to transact in that season 
(“hot” market); also, better matches 
imply higher surpluses and thus higher 
house prices 
Nash bargaining 
random match-
quality (while the 
contact probability 
is always one) 
the calibrated model can quantitatively account for 
the seasonal fluctuations in prices and transactions 
observed in U.S. and U.K. 
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Diaz and Jerez (2009) 
when hit by idiosyncratic shocks, agents 
become mismatched and seek to move, 
but they take time to locate an 
appropriate unit 
sellers post prices to 
attract buyers (as in 
Albrecht et al. (2009)) 
competitive search 
process 
+ matching function 
+ market tightness 
the model is able to generate a positive co-
movement in prices, sales and liquidity 
Albrecht et al. (2009) 
houses are sold by auction and are 
sometimes sold above, sometimes 
below and sometimes at the asking 
price. Hence, the final selling price need 
not be the same as the posted price 
“asking price”: the price 
posted by a seller is 
used to attract buyers 
(i.e. sellers post asking 
prices, and buyers 
direct their search 
based on these prices) 
directed search 
+ market tightness 
it captures the main features of the house-selling 
process in the U.S. and explains the role of asking 
price and its relationship to the sales price 
Piazzesi and 
Schneider (2009) 
a household is initially a “happy owner” 
who obtains housing services; however, 
s/he may be hit by a shock that makes 
him an “unhappy” owner who no longer 
obtains any services from the house. 
S/he can then sell the house and 
purchase a new one to again begin 
obtaining housing services 
seller makes a take-it-
or-leave-it offer, and 
the buyer accepts or 
rejects the offer 
 
matching function 
+ random search 
optimists (investors) can drive up the average 
transaction price without a large increase in trading 
volume or in their market share 
Genesove and Han 
(2010) 
demand shocks (average income and 
population are used as demand proxies) 
Nash bargaining 
(with an extension to 
the case of “take-it-or-
leave-it offer”) 
matching function 
+ random search 
+ market tightness 
a positive demand shock leads to shorter seller time 
on the market and fewer home visits, while buyer 
time on the market is much less sensitive 
Lisi (2011) 
direct relationship between market 
tightness and house price 
Nash bargaining 
matching function 
+ random search 
+ market tightness 
the standard matching framework à la Mortensen-
Pissarides is integrated with the hedonic price 
theory  
Leung and Zhang 
(2011) 
one-side heterogeneity which generates 
corresponding submarkets; sellers are 
different in terms of their waiting costs 
for selling the house, where buyers are 
free to enter either submarket 
Nash bargaining 
matching function 
+ random search 
+ market tightness 
the model is able to reproduce the three basic facts 
of housing market (price dispersion, positive 
correlation between house prices and time-on-the-
market, and between house prices and trading 
volume 
Peterson (2012) 
the model combines search frictions 
with a behavioural assumption where 
market participants incorrectly believe 
that the efficient market theory holds 
(the so-called “Fooled by search”) 
Nash bargaining 
matching function 
+ random search 
+ market tightness 
the model can replicate the observation that real 
price growth and turnover are highly correlated, 
explaining over 70% of 
the housing bubble in the United States 
 
